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Assessing the Competitiveness of International Financial Services in Particular Locations: 
A Survey of Methods and Perspectives 
 
George M. von Furstenberg∗ 
 
Abstract 
The International Financial Services (IFS) industry is restructuring internally and by location. 
This paper outlines the economic forces and analytical methods that may be applied to examine 
the economic drivers of these processes as ever more cities, particularly in East Asia, are vying 
to attract IFS providers and their clients. The ICT revolution has made those IFS that can be 
commoditized footloose in search of cost efficiency. High value-added financial services, 
however, will continue to be developed and coordinated in a few major IFS centers that have 
invested in, or capitalized on, regional or global advantages for themselves and their clients. The 
resulting pattern of functional fragmentation and geographic dispersal may facilitate analyses of 
the competitiveness of different lines of the financial services business in a particular location by 
methods such as Data Envelopment and Stochastic Frontier Analysis. These forms of 
comparative efficiency analysis have recently been questioned and their results reinterpreted. 
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I.  Introduction 
International financial services (IFS) is big business not just for some very small but functional 
offshore financial centers (OFCs).1 Kaufman (2001, p. 366) cites an estimate that 7 percent of 
British GDP around 1998 was brought forth within one square mile of what is know as “the city” 
by 1 million employees, indirect employment included.2 In Luxembourg, financial services in 
2003 accounted for 30 percent of gross value added3 not counting ancillary services such as 
legal, accounting and tourism. The percentages for Hong Kong and Singapore were much 
smaller.4 Still there are several countries and cities of appreciable size for whom supplying 
international financial services is one of their most important, and often subsidized, businesses. 
Along the coasts of Asia and the Persian Gulf, almost all rapidly developing countries, large and 
small, now appear bent on growing their own international services centers. Established centers, 
in turn, worry about maintaining their edge.5 
This paper outlines what is required to attract the high-value lines of the international 
financial services business to a particular location (Section 2) and what are the economic benefits 
and fiscal costs of promoting these lines (Section 3). Keeping them in place requires 
macroeconomic stability (Section 4) and maintaining an internationally competitive level of 
                                                 
1  Throughout we are not concerned with OFCs that are merely booking centers. Such centers provide a legal place 
of record for transactions that actually take place elsewhere. The heterogeneity of offshore jurisdictions by stage of 
financial development is obvious from the composition of the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors: Hong Kong 
and Singapore are members as are Labuan, Mauritius, and Vanuatu (see BIS, 2006a, p. 61). Jao (2003) provides a 
comprehensive typology of financial centers. 
2  McKinsey & Co. for Bloomberg, Michael R., and Shumer, Charles E. (2007, pp. 10, 15) contains an estimate of 
318,000 for London’s financial services workforce, and 328,400 for New York’s in 2005. It cites an estimate 
suggesting that every “securities” job accounts for two additional jobs in other industries. Applying a multiplier of 3 
to “securities” jobs would lead back to the earlier estimate of an employment effect in London of about 1 million. 
3  For the sources see von Furstenberg (2007). 
4  Zhao, Li and Wang (2004, p. 587) report that only 2.25 percent of Shanghai’s total employment was in the FIRE 
sector in 2000. This percentage does not include employment in government agencies associated with foreign 
exchange administration and trading, banking supervision, and related financial functions.  
5 For instance, a March 2007 conference on U.S. Capital Market Competitiveness, convened by the U.S. Treasury 
Department, called for initiatives to replace the fragmented and largely rules-based U.S. regulatory structure with a 
(more) unified and largely principles-based structure similar to that of the U.K. Financial Services Authority. 
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technical and allocative efficiency of operations (Section 5) with the cost-saving infrastructure 
and local amenities provided. This infrastructure may relate not only to operational assets such as 
communications, automated trading platforms, and international accessibility, but also to 
characteristics of the macroeconomic system and the quality of governance, industry institutions, 
and regulatory oversight.  The paper then sketches how developments in ICT that affect the 
operation of capital markets and the need for relationship banking and finance may affect the 
outlook for IFS in specific locations (Section 6) and concludes (Section 7). 
 
II.  Requirements for Operation of Offshore and International Financial Service Centers 
Lists of these requirements often start with libertarian criteria such as the political independence 
of such centers in a free-market and private-enterprise environment (see, for instance, Kaufman, 
2001, p. 370). However they often depend on their Financial Services Authority or similar 
institution to be their facilitator and promoter, rather than a mere arms-length supervisor. Indeed 
OFCs and International Financial Service Centers (IFSCs) often have been planned as part of an 
industrial development policy by national or subnational units of government. Zhang (2003) 
provides a vivid account of the strong and quite visible hand of government in particular with 
regard to Shanghai’s Pudong New Area Liujiazui development.6 For three or four decades after 
1949, Shanghai had actually been penalized, rather than favored, by the central government.7 
Hence the private enterprises engaged in international financial business are not always far 
removed from their host government, and principled libertarianism is not what such centers 
                                                 
6  Similarly the Government of Hong Kong, GHK (2007, p. 50 (4.20), and p. 47 (4.11)) calls for “central 
government authorities to adopt a proactive policy to facilitate the use of Hong Kong’s financial system for 
Mainland’s international financial activities.”  
7  During this time as little as 13 percent of the Shanghai’s revenue was left in the city rather than remitted to the 
central government, while local  retention averaged 30 percent elsewhere, including Beijing (see Lai, 2006, p. 4). 
  
4
generally seek or practice. Rather, they want the government to get out of the way and have its 
ear all the same. 
There are, however, a number of fairly universal prerequisites for OFC/IFSC success that 
have been enumerated by Kaufman (2001), Jao (2003), Park, Ito and Wang (2005), and others. In 
Table 1 these are assembled, condensed, and then organized by me into macroeconomic 
prerequisites, infrastructure and human-capital requirements, and industry prerequisites. Not all 
of these prerequisites are immediately persuasive. Why, for instance, should stable exchange 
rates and low inflation be a “requirement” under A-3 when offshore centers do not operate in a 
minor local currency anyway? The answer is that these macroeconomic conditions are relevant 
to banking soundness, the depth of the domestic financial system (see Hausmann et al., 2000), 
and the credibility of the host government and all its undertakings. Also, each of the main criteria 
listed in Table 1 usefully could be expanded. For instance, point C-1 of Table 1 relates to the 
availability of well-motivated and sophisticated bank supervisors. The 25 Core Principles for 
Effective Banking Supervision promulgated by the BIS (2006b) might then be referenced to spell 
out what sophisticated supervisors are to accomplish. Such instructive detail aside, the message 
is that roundly failing to meet just a few of the main criteria listed in Table 1 may be fatal to 
countries’ getting or keeping legitimate IFS business.  
 
III.  Economic Benefits and Fiscal Costs of Hosting an IFSC 
How hard countries or jurisdictions should fight to attract international financial services 
business obviously depends on the benefits to be expected from success in the endeavor. Yet 
there are few studies of whether having an IFSC adds to an economy’s rate of growth and to the 
living standards of its people, all considered. There is also little or no quantitative work on the 
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Table 1: Requirements for Successful OFCs and IFSCs 
A. Macroeconomic Prerequisites 
A-1. Free international capital flows with all (for IFSCs), or at least special zones (for 
OFCs), of a country, and remote access from and to its foreign suppliers and clients 
A-2. Absence of domestic interest rate controls to allow financial-product development 
A-3. Stable exchange rates, low inflation, and freedom of currency substitution 
A-4. Fiscal-system and sovereign-debt sustainability  
A-5. Domestic tranquility, labor peace, and low levels of crime, fraud, and corruption 
and of  business in furtherance of financial and other crimes or tax evasion 
 
B. Physical and Institutional Infrastructure Requirements 
B-1. Excellent ICT, transportation, and amenities systems and public provision of 
accurate financial information and ratings; appropriate use of privacy safeguards 
B-2. Advanced listing and exchange systems, efficient OTC and organized-exchange 
trading platforms and/or trading privileges on foreign exchanges  
B-3. Efficient settlement procedures for payments and for trades in stock, bond, and 
derivatives markets that are up to international standards 
B-4. A strong legal system, including property rights, contract enforcement, functioning 
court system, bankruptcy processes, and international accounting and auditing rules 
 
C. Ability to Meet Human Capital Requirements 
C-1. Availability of well-motivated and sophisticated bankers and their regulators/ 
supervisors and of analytical and managerial support staff critical for financial services 
C-2. A favorable living environment and free entry for expatriates employed in the 
financial-service sector, -- conditions that lower the cost of imported talent 
C-3. A large talent pool and widespread competence in English  
C-4. A tradition of professionalism and honesty in the host country or jurisdiction 
 
D. Industry Prerequisites 
D-1. Economically strong and credible financial institutions with free foreign entry 
D-2. A large complement of other financial businesses and of those who serve them 
D-3. Minimum bank and securities regulation except prudential 
D-4. A critical mass of financial activity to achieve economies of scale and scope 
D-5. A high degree of efficiency by international standards in financial trading and 
engineering, intermediation and settlements, risk transformation, and underwriting 
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optimal degree of integration of offshore and onshore operations and on the links to be 
encouraged between them at various stages of development. 
Regarding the fiscal costs of IFS, the list of government measures to establish and grow 
IFSCs is long and varied. The general practice is to tax very sparingly, if at all, income earned 
from international financial service business either by those conducting it or by nonresident 
entities financing it through their deposits, investments, and loans. For instance, withholding 
taxes are generally not imposed on the interest income of such entities. Outright discrimination 
in favor of offshore over onshore activities is common and pervasive as, for instance, when the 
tax on bank profits from the Asian-Currency Unit (ACU), but not the Domestic-Banking Unit 
(DBU) of Singapore banks was cut from 40 to 10 percent in 1970 (Jin, 2005, p. 211). Such 
discrimination is also involved when expatriates employed in the international financial service 
business receive generous tax-free allowances in Hong Kong, or when those who have been 
accorded “enhanced fund manager” status in Singapore enjoy a complete tax holiday on fee 
income from providing investment management and advisory services to foreign investors (Jin, 
2005, p. 222). Where there are value-added taxes as in Ireland, the international financial 
business may be exempt. Direct and indirect fiscal subsidies that provide cost savings and in-
kind benefits to the IFS industry are common. These may take the form of government 
expenditures on IFS-friendly regulation, training, and construction of infrastructure to provide 
pertinent facilities and services. 
Pump-priming of lines of the financial business that are to be drawn to a particular 
location is also common. The Monetary Authority of Singapore and the Government of 
Singapore Investment Corporation, for instance, have placed $35 billion with managers in the 
private sector to encourage the growth of the fund management industry (Park, Ito and Wang, 
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2005, p. 9). In addition, the government provides almost one fifth of the venture capital funding 
made available in Singapore, and there is preferential tax treatment for capital gains that are 
particularly important for the venture-capital industry (Jin, 2005, pp. 225-226).  
Another tax expenditure is due to the loss of seignorage that is associated with currency 
substitution being facilitated by the operation of OFCs in countries that do not have a domestic 
currency of international standing. In Hong Kong, for instanced, over 50 percent of banking 
business has been in foreign currency denominations, mostly USD (Huang, 2005, p. 195).8 Thus 
risk reduction through internationalization and currency substitution has tended to shrink the 
relative size of the domestic-currency component of the financial sector of financially open 
countries with minor currencies (see Bossone, Honohan, and Long, 2002, p. 120). The size of the 
inflation tax base is diminished and the disincentive to inflate is strengthened by (the threat of) 
currency substitution. 
Considering tax preferences, subsidies, lower seignorage revenue, and government 
industry-development expenditures together, IFSCs and OFCs are not likely to make a direct 
positive fiscal contribution to the countries that compete for them by market and nonmarket 
means. Rather they are associated with a narrowing of the tax base toward non-traded goods and 
immobile factors. Such a tax structure may or may not be justified under the inverse-elasticity 
rule of optimal taxation or under international trade rules against competition-distorting 
government subsidies. Hence the extra economic benefits of growing IFSCs rather than some 
other business would have to be sufficient to compensate for the extra fiscal costs. Only the 
location choices for the commoditized parts of the IFS business appear increasingly to conform 
                                                 
8  Since 2006, growing amounts of liquid funds and currency obtained from RMB deposits at banks in Hong Kong 
have tended to be “returned” to the Mainland through the issuance in the Hong Kong market of RMB-denominated 
bonds by official and some private borrowers from the Mainland. Yet use of the RMB in Hong Kong has spread. 
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to the economic laws of global competition and cost efficiency without much depending on 
government promotion, subsidies, and industrial planning. 
  
IV.  Macro-Level Efficiency Criteria for IFSCs   
Two aspects of efficiency of the financial system, macro and micro, are commonly distinguished. 
Macro-level efficiency relates to the efficient transfer between surplus and deficit units -- or 
lenders and borrowers, savers and investors -- both within and between countries at low cost and 
with minimal risk of a major financial crisis. As Denizer, Dinc, and Tarimcilar (2007, p.192) 
note, adverse environmental factors, such as a high degree of volatility in inflation and growth 
rates, detract from banking efficiency, and the effectiveness of financial reforms depends on a 
stable macroeconomic environment. An IFSC’s contribution to the macroeconomic efficiency of 
its host country or jurisdiction can come through two channels. The IFSC may contribute to 
growth and stability first through its influence on the choice of the tax, currency, and exchange-
rate regimes as discussed in von Furstenberg (2007), and secondly through changing the 
correlation of its jurisdiction’s business cycle with the world business cycle. For instance, Hong 
Kong, which has maintained a fixed exchange rate with USD since 1983, has a high exposure to 
world-economy shocks represented by the United States (see Genberg, 2005, p. 22), and the 
influence of its financial channels to the world is stabilizing. The reason is that U.S. real interest 
rates, that impact Hong Kong’s, have moved in a manner consistent with an active application of 
the Taylor rule for at least two decades, thereby providing countercyclical-policy benefits for 
Hong Kong as well. By contrast, Cheung, Tam, and Yiu (2006, p. 11) found “no substantial 
evidence that the Chinese interest rate is driven by the U.S. rate” in spite of the RMB’s tight peg 
to USD over most of their sample period from February 1996 to April 2006. 
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1. Risk Assessment 
If there is a substantial leakage of funds raised from nonresidents into the domestic financial 
system, known as out-in by its sources (nonresident = out) and uses (resident = in), the 
regulatory and reserve standards applied onshore will in fact be no higher than those applied 
offshore. Because of this leakage, currency-denomination and maturity mismatches may 
intensify, and domestic monetary policy may be undermined. Kaufman (2000, p. 6) relates that 
fully 60 percent of the $50 billion in loans made by the ostensibly “offshore” Bangkok 
International Banking Facility (BIBF) in the year before the East-Asian crisis that started in 1997 
were “out-in” transactions used to finance domestic firms. Especially when there is a strong 
expectation that exchange rate fluctuations with USD will continue to be small, maturity 
mismatches and carry trades of borrowing cheaply in major foreign currencies to lend at much 
higher interest rates in local currencies may be encouraged. As the 1997-98 East-Asian troubles 
showed, a deep crisis ensues when such fair-weather strategies come to grief and end up 
disrupting much of the financial intermediation system that is critical to economic vitality.  
Fragility may also have been raised by offshore operations because banks that operate in 
branch form in the offshore sector may not be required to hold capital and hence are not subject 
to minimum capital adequacy requirements or to capital-based limits on large exposures (Huang, 
2005, p. 204). Add the increased probability of supervision failures in complex networks of 
financial relationships and the result is that “some offshore centers have magnified any financial 
problems in their countries” (Kaufman, 2000, p. 6).  
If a substantial leakage develops in the opposite direction, in-out, there may be sudden 
credit contraction and asset deflation associated with capital flight. It appears that business-cycle 
synchronization among Asian countries in the 1990s can at least partially be explained by 
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synchronization of net capital flows and the ensuing boom-bust cycles after financial market 
liberalization (Park, Ito, and Wang, 2005, p. 5).  
 
2.  Policy Obstacles to Financial Development 
IFSCs can function as market makers for their region’s securities to the world. Conversely they 
also can provide risk reduction through internationalization of the portfolios of domestic 
investors. However, capital controls may transform diversifiable into non-diversifiable risk for 
the residents of the area under such controls. Indeed the Mainland stock markets present a high 
level of, otherwise diversifiable, risk. Jeon, Oh, and Yang (2006, p. 85) have estimated that the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen markets have been the least correlated with other stock exchanges, in 
particular the U.S. market (correlation coefficient 0.019), while the Hong Kong market has been 
the most correlated (0.594) with the United States among 10 East Asian markets in their study. 
This suggests that there is much more idiosyncratic noise in the Mainland than in the Hong-Kong 
China market. To the extent capital controls continue to hamper international portfolio 
diversification in the Mainland in spite of the progressive expansion of quotas to invest in 
foreign exposure under the Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor (QDII) scheme, the globally 
non-systematic part of the volatility of China’s stock market, like its political risk, is non-
diversifiable for its residents.  
Domestic interest-rate controls, such as maximum deposit and minimum lending rates in 
Mainland China, and official credit guidance long have stunted the development of the RMB 
loan and bond markets (see HKIMR/BIS/CEPR, 2006). Liu and Yang (2005) thus had noted an 
“underlending syndrome”on the Mainland. Furthermore, market-based yield curves suitable for 
national and international financial instruments and for the construction of derivatives have 
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remained incomplete. Derivatives need such yield curves for information, pricing, arbitrage, and 
product development. They also need interest rates on RMB-denominated instruments that are 
determined freely in international financial markets. Lacking that, internationally hedged interest 
parity has been grossly violated (Ma and McCauley, 2008), as the pricing of RMB/USD NDFs 
has not been tied down by arbitrage. However, underlying conditions have started to change in 
these respects, with forward exchange rates built on Shibor, the Shanghai interbank offered rate, 
and its yield curve up to one year, becoming available in early 2007.  
 
V.  Microeconomic Efficiency Measures for IFSCs 
Measuring the efficiency of the financial service industry and its different lines of business 
presents special challenges. As Welch (2006) explained, the simple accounting approach, of 
using cost-of-funds to gross-income ratios as an inverse indicator of efficiency, has severe 
problems. The reason is that profitable financial services that are fee intensive inherently are cost 
intensive as well. Performance-related pay and option values for lead executives also may drive 
up the accounting measure of costs together with firm income.9 Hence cost/income ratios tend to 
be elevated for high-value added services. 
Major providers of international financial services are multi-product firms. The allocation 
of costs that is required to establish the profitability of each product is difficult because many of 
them utilize common facilities of the firm. Cost and value attribution are even more complicated 
because many of the financial products of the firm potentially are in joint demand by its 
                                                 
9  Kaplan and Rauh (2007, p. 37) estimate that individuals they characterize as Wall Street professionals comprise a 
greater fraction of the top end of the income distribution that the top five executives of “Main Street” public 
companies. They also report (p. 3) that, in 2004, nine times as many Wall Street investors (e.g., hedge fund 
managers) earned in excess of $100 million as public-company CEOs. They examine whether these elevated 
incomes are the result of performance, quasi-rents, or even “theft” and conclude that theories of skill-based 
technological change, greater scale, and superstars, in some combination, provide the most plausible explanation.  
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customers and also function as service inputs to some of its outputs. Nevertheless progressive 
commoditization and outsourcing of sub-functions have facilitated the accurate pricing of those 
functions that are performed not only in-house but also by specialized suppliers and monolines 
which price them directly in the market. Thus the fragmentation that has reached the 
international financial service business is both enabling, and creating pressure for, more precise 
cost and profit accounting for a range of functions.  
The price of functions that can be commoditized has been declining sharply (see, for 
instance, Jones, 2002) relative to that of actively managed and custom-tailored functions. Hence 
discussion of costs and benefits of advanced IFSCs increasingly relates to upper-level service 
functions displaying heterogeneity of supply and demand: They are performed subject to 
negotiated remuneration schemes and economic-rent sharing arrangements for their top 
executives and demanded by high-net-worth individuals and institutional investors requiring 
individual attention. In private banking, for instance, an accepted premise is that wealth 
management is not about selling products, not even the firm’s own products, but about advice.   
 
1.  Data Envelopment Analysis and X-Inefficiency 
The development and introduction of new products is subject to financial-engineering and 
market-acceptance risk. But once the profitability of new products has been established, there 
will be pressure on financial service providers to introduce and offer them equally elsewhere, 
and the technology of creating and managing these products will be diffused. Nevertheless, at 
any one time, there can be significant differences in the types of financial services offered in a 
particular location, and there may be productivity differences between locations in performing 
the same types of services. If efficiency leaders can be identified that can be taken to represent 
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the technical efficiency frontier, there may be useful comparative measures of the degree to 
which other firms, or groups of firms, in a particular location fall short of this frontier.  
One such measure may be obtained with Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). DEA is a 
nonparametric “extreme-point” method used in operations research for the estimation of 
efficiency frontiers for multiple outputs produced with given inputs.  This method assumes that 
efficiency measures are free from random disturbances and places little structure on the 
piecewise linear best-practice frontier that results (Carbó Valverde, Humphrey, and López del 
Paso, 2007a, p. 211).10 Casu and Girardone (2006), among others, provide an application to 
banks. Given this efficient set and an assumption of linear returns to scale, inefficient producers 
are defined by the percent, less than 100, of the radial distance to the frontier which they achieve. 
For instance, if the score of a producer, known as a decision-making unit (DMU), is 0.68 on a 
scale of 0 to 1, the implication is that the most efficient corresponding “virtual” producer (a 
linear combination of efficient producers producing the same output mix as the inefficient 
producer) could achieve the same output combination efficiently by using only 68 percent as 
much of each and every resource as the inefficient producer.  
If the efficiency level of the leaders in principle is available to all industry participants 
wherever they may be located and inefficiency is assumed to arise from less output being 
produced with given inputs, this shortfall now is known as the degree of X-inefficiency as 
Altunbas and Chakravarty (1998) explain. This definition of X-efficiency as the effectiveness 
with which an organization uses its given set of inputs to produce outputs fits the DEA method 
but is narrower than that of Leibenstein (1966), who introduced the concept, because it focuses 
just on what is called technical efficiency below. The term X-inefficiency originally was used for 
                                                 
10  In practice, these authors (p. 217) and others (see Chen, 2002) have relaxed the assumption that random error is 
zero by constructing bootstrapped confidence intervals in assessing results or working with chance-constrained DEA 
(CCDEA) incorporating a stochastic mechanism.  
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operating below the production frontier for any number of not separately measured (“X”) reasons 
that could be managerial or motivational. Leibenstein’s definition of allocative inefficiency as 
being at a socially inefficient point on the production frontier on account of, say, monopoly or 
tariffs also differs from the definition below in that it deals with the non-optimality of the output 
or input mix from a social-welfare, rather than private-profit, perspective. The latter perspective, 
adopted in current literature, focuses on reasons for outcomes that fail to maximize firm profits 
under prevailing opportunities and external constraints. It takes output and input prices as given 
to the firm and does not deal with the social welfare costs of any distortions of these prices. 
X-inefficiency in the broadest sense may be decomposed and characterized as follows: 
 (1) The level of the best production and distribution technology that is available in a particular 
location or industry setting unavoidably may lag behind that of the global industry leaders,  
(2) the efficiency of global leaders and others may be subject to random influences and errors of 
measurement, and with few exceptions (see Chen, 2002), random errors are not identified and 
taken out under the distribution-free DEA and other frontier-fitting methods, 
(3) the mix by lines of business and their quality, scale, and marketing may not be optimal for a 
given DMU, but a DMU’s efficiency is defined for whatever combination of outputs it produces,  
(4) the given mix of inputs -- including management, operations and procedures -- used in any or 
all of the lines of business may not be optimal, and  
(5) X-efficiency analysis is designed to measure the degree of inefficiency, not its sources. 
Point (1) often is taken to refer to comparative technical efficiency as it measures 
location-specific differences in total factor productivity relative to an observed national or global 
maximum, while points (3) and (4) are aspects of allocative efficiency within the local technical 
efficiency frontier. Under certain conditions the two efficiency indexes are multiplicative (see 
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Chen, Skully, and Brown, 2005, p. 237). For instance, if the level (1) score is 0.9 and (3) and (4) 
together are scored 0.8, a particular IFSC or local establishment would have a total efficiency 
score of 0.72. Attempting to make the distinction may be of some value: Moving up in the global 
comparative technical efficiency ratings could well require major and coordinated investments in 
the development of new human and physical resources, processes, infrastructures, and technical 
capabilities. Improving allocative efficiency so as to move closer to the profit maximizing point 
on the local technology frontier normally is quicker, cheaper, and easier to organize than to shift 
out that frontier. In addition, the degree of allocative efficiency can in good part be improved by 
local establishments acting on their own, while a major push to raise the level of technology, and 
hence the degree of technical efficiency, may be largely out of their hands.  
 
2.  Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
This form of analysis with the measures of production, cost, revenue, and profit efficiency it can 
yield, provides an alternative method of efficiency analysis of firms that produce multiple 
outputs with a variety of inputs. This parametric method improves upon the previous method 
principally in regard to point (2) by estimating the production function representing the 
maximum output that is achievable with given technology from a bundle of inputs with due 
allowance for statistical noise.  Furthermore, by being explicit about the input-output 
relationship, defects (3), (4), and (5) are alleviated more easily than under the DEA method. At 
the same time, advance information requirements about the form of the multi-product production 
function are demanding.  
A small amount of notation, taken from Bandyopadhyay and Das (2006, p. 167), may be 
useful to characterize how stochastic frontier analysis, SFA, separates uncontrollable error 
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representing statistical noise and controllable error representing technical or allocative 
inefficiency. For the ith of n firms, that model can be written:  
 
yi = f(xi, β) + εi,  where εi = vi – ui, and ui ≥ 0.   (1) 
 
Here yi is the output of the ith firm, xi the vector of non-stochastic inputs, εi the random 
error associated with yi, and β is a vector of unknown parameters of the production function f(.). 
The random error εi is composed of two unobservable stochastic terms, vi the statistical noise and 
ui the inefficiency error. Since ui ≥ 0, yi ≤ fsi(xi, β), where fsi(xi, β) = f(xi, β) + vi represents the 
maximum possible output and is known as the stochastic production frontier of the ith firm. In the 
simplest case, the component errors vi and ui can be represented as independently distributed 
normals, but with ui being truncated from below at 0.11 As equation (1) would be estimated in 
logarithmic form, ui would be the exponential inefficiency rate so that exp(-ui)≤1 could be 
comparable to the relative efficiency rate described earlier for the DEA method.  
 A comprehensive treatment of the stochastic frontier model, its econometric estimation 
and the decomposition into inefficiency measures, has been provided by Kumbhakar and Lovell 
(2003). The authors start with input-oriented and output-oriented concepts of technical efficiency 
that refer to the minimum combination of inputs required to produce given outputs or the 
maximum combination of outputs obtainable from given inputs, respectively. The results for 
technical inefficiency are dual measures of the relative radial distance to the relevant minimum 
input or maximum output frontier using isoquants as standards (p. 44). The authors point out that 
                                                 
11  Alternative distributional assumptions have been imposed on the inefficiencies and random error in order to 
disentangle the two. Among them are the thick frontier approach (TFA) and the distribution-free approach (DFA). 
For a fuller exposition and a check for the methodological robustness of the efficiency scores and rankings obtained 
with the four different approaches, including DEA and SFA, see Bauer, Berger, Ferrier and Humphrey (1998). 
  
17
these measures are numerically equivalent only if the technology is characterized by constant 
returns to scale (p. 46) and that more discerning measures, that are not based on proportional 
variations of all inputs or outputs, have been proposed in the literature but rarely applied (p. 44).  
They note that in any event economic significance is limited because the degree of technical 
inefficiency is established without reference to a given set of relative prices of inputs and outputs 
and because no behavioral objective, such as profit maximization, is yet imposed.  
Hence from an economic perspective, factor and product price and cost features and rate-
of-return objectives need to be added. Cost minimization requires input-oriented technical 
efficiency and allocative efficiency to avoid both excessive input use and a non-optimal input 
mix. Revenue maximization requires the avoidance of output-oriented technical inefficiency (due 
to not producing as much output as possible with given inputs) and of an inappropriate output 
mix. Finally, profit maximization requires technical efficiency as well as input-allocative and 
output-allocative efficiency, as well as operating at the right scale in achieving these efficiencies 
(Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2003, pp. 50-60). All these different efficiency measures, whose precise 
relation to each other is explored just below, may be appropriate objectives within the limited 
sphere of particular agents’ responsibility but only the last measure, profit efficiency, provides a 
comprehensive measure that is often equated with economic efficiency. 
The degree of Profit Efficiency (PE) is measured by actual revenue minus cost divided by 
maximum profit just as Revenue Efficiency (RE) is measured by actual revenue divided by the 
maximum revenue that can be obtained by use of the firm’s given set of inputs. Cost Efficiency 
(CE), however, is measured by the ratio of the minimum cost of producing a given output vector 
to observed, i.e., actual, cost. Hence, both RE and CE are measured such that 0≤ RE ≥1 and 0≤ 
CE ≥1. After cancelling Maximum Revenue, PE may be decomposed into RE minus x times the 
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inverse of CE, all divided by 1-x, where x<1 is the ratio of Minimum Cost to Maximum 
Revenue:  
 
PE = [RE – x(CE)-1] / (1-x).    (2) 
 
Unlike the measures of RE and CE, the measure of PE is bounded from below by zero only if 
both maximum and actual profits are positive. Only the first requirement, that minimum costs are 
less than maximum revenue so that x<1 is likely to be non-restrictive for the vast majority of 
economic applications. Actual profits divided by Maximum Revenue, in the numerator of the 
expression for PE in equation (2), on the other hand, may at times be negative. In that case 
attention may be directed to the values of RE and CE and their technical and allocative 
inefficiency components that contribute to this negative outcome.  
Of course when input and output configurations can not be changed rapidly in response to 
unexpected developments except at great cost, occasionally realizing losses may be part of a 
sustainable dynamic business strategy. Accounting measures of profit efficiency, except in 
simple peer-group comparisons assuming ceteris paribus, may only be inputs for further analysis 
focusing on their relation to asset value, and hence on the real options and risk diversification 
strategies underpinning the time profile and present value of discounted cash flow.  
 
3.  Applications to Measuring Microeconomic Efficiency  
For management and policy purposes it is often necessary to analyze and decompose readings 
from several measures of efficiency because efficiency comparisons based on a single criterion 
may be misleading. Denizer, Dinc, and Tarimcilar (2007, p. 181) provide a good example when 
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they reject measures of intermediation efficiency for state-owned and privately-owned banks as 
insufficient by themselves. They report finding no difference in the efficiency with which deposit 
inputs were linked to loan outputs by the two groups, a result they called “unexpected.”12 They 
note that if they had been able to adjust the measure of loan output for the loss of (non-
performing) loan value from “political” lending by state-owned banks, the result could have been 
very different. Jao, Jiang, Feng and Willenbockel (2007, pp. 638-640) even find that the Big 
Four Chinese banks, which were still state-owned during their sample period, had slightly higher 
technical efficiency than joint-stock banks, while being less efficient in other respects, in part 
due to government-directed lending. Shi, Zhang and Liu (2007, pp. 17-18) since have shown that 
the way in which political-economy considerations enter into performance measures for banks is 
quite complex, at least in China. When they use 10 financial ratios available to them for different 
classes of banks to extract four principal components including one that appears to reflect 
liquidity, they advise caution. High liquidity, they explain (p. 21), may be associated with a 
bank’s low efficiency in asset utilization -- say for government bonds rather than loans to 
business -- making is necessary to also consult other indicators of prudent risk exposure and 
capital profitability.  
Blommestein and Santiso (2007) similarly emphasize that cost-effectiveness should not 
be the sole decision criterion when public-debt managers assess which instruments to issue -- 
unindexed or variously indexed, and potentially denominated in foreign currency at different 
maturities. Rather the government’s entire asset and liability profile is to be managed with an eye 
also to providing for macroeconomic shock absorption, i.e., consumption smoothing coupled 
with debt sustainability. 
                                                 
12  Claessens and Glaessner (1998, p. 30) report a similar dissonance for insurance companies in South Korea: They 
appeared remarkably cost-efficient but many of them were technically insolvent.  
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As noted previously, a basic, but empirically difficult, set of distinctions is between 
technical and allocative efficiencies as recently reviewed in Brissimis, Delis, and Tsionas (2006). 
While it has been estimated that banks in Europe on average would gain about as much from 
better allocation of inputs (16%) as from reaching the highest available standard of efficiency 
(18%), the three co-authors (2006, pp. 19-20) note that the use of individual inputs for particular 
bundles of financial services is still too little investigated.  
A study by Kwan (2006) found a total cost inefficiency of 16-30 percent for the banking 
sector in Hong Kong 1992-99, similar to the average inefficiency level of U.S. and European 
banks relative to their respective champions, while Fu and Heffernan (2007) estimated a degree 
of inefficiency of 40-60 percent for banks on the Mainland for 1985-2002. The implications are 
that differences in the degree of inefficiency between banks, which may be state-owned and 
subsidized or private and competitive, and the average size of these inefficiencies are much 
greater in Mainland China than in Hong Kong SAR or other world-class financial centers, in part 
due to deficiencies of competition policy and incomplete privatizations in the Mainland.  
Measures such as these recently have been reconsidered in part because they move so 
little over time as to appear beyond correction. The fundamental reconsideration called for in 
Carbó Valverde, Humphrey, and López del Paso (2007a, 2007b) thus questions the significance 
of broad inefficiency measures for management and operations. These authors note that if the 
average cost of inefficiency in various nations’ banking industries keeps being estimated at 20-
25% as Berger and Humphrey (1997) had reported in their far-reaching survey, the average bank 
could more than double its net return on assets (assuming realistically that net income is around 
17% of total costs) by restructuring operations to look like those banks that appear to be most 
efficient. If so, the incentives to restructure should be overwhelming. However, the average 
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levels of measured inefficiency do not seem to be consistently falling over time for any of the 
numerous countries that have been studied. Hence the three authors ask whether measures of 
inefficiency are (a) overstated and incentives to improve that much weaker or (b) measured 
correctly but attributable to factors that lie largely beyond the effective control of management. 
They conclude from a study of Spanish savings and commercial banks (2007a, p. 216): 
“By achieving efficiency levels of over 0.99 for interest costs and from 0.94 to 0.96 for 
operational expenses, it is clear that banks do not actually misuse 20-25% of their resources.” 
Some of the productivity differences may be intentional and not reflect a missed opportunity to 
reduce costs. For instance, “many banks will purposefully hire more workers per branch office 
and/or provide what seem to be ‘too many’ ATMs and standard branch offices as part of a 
competitive strategy to be more accessible and to provide more convenient services.” Hence only 
1-5 percentage points of the 20-25% cost inefficiency may be unexplained or represent a kind of 
X-inefficiency that could potentially benefit from corrective action by management.   
A more recent study by the same three authors (2007b) for a broader set of European 
banks similarly found that country-specific differences in the business environment that are 
largely out of the hands of banks explain a larger portion of the cross-country efficiency 
differences than is usually the case with standard analyses that focus only on bank-specific cost 
conditions.13 By reducing the scope for unmeasured environmental variations, this careful work 
moves the debate on from the stalemate implied by the justified doubts earlier expressed by 
Berger (2007, pp. 134-135) about using a common meta-frontier. He argued that it is unlikely 
that any controls for environmental differences or any methodological breakthroughs are 
                                                 
13  Kwan (2002) had found that per unit bank operating costs differ systematically across Asian countries but for 
reasons attributable to differences in their native bank production functions rather than to differences in the degree 
of openness of their banking sectors.  
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sufficient to eliminate the possibility that measured (international) differences in efficiency are 
due to unmeasured environmental variations rather than actual efficiency differences.   
 
4.  Differences in Market-Quality 
Certain IFSCs function as market makers for their region’s securities to their citizens and to the 
world. Their microeconomic efficiency in performing this function has been analyzed by the 
liquidity, volatility, and relative absence of price anomalies or “bubbles” in their regional or 
national securities market. Liu and Yang (2005) have applied this approach to evaluate the 
microeconomic efficiency of the Shanghai market even before it became an IFSC. They gave 
that market low marks: Its systematic risk for Chinese is high as stocks show pronounced co-
movement with a “political” factor. Price/earnings ratios are excessive, volatile, and bubble-
prone in their view. They also find positive excess returns for small firms, a finding familiar 
from a “priced factor” in advanced markets. On the other hand, bid-ask spreads are low in 
Shanghai compared with Hong Kong where the stock broking industry is cartelized. Except for 
the low spreads, these factors are not propitious for growing an offshore market in Shanghai.  
 
VI. The Outlook and Future Location for OFCs and IFSCs 
As Tschoegl (2000, p. 9) has noted, simple considerations of the cost of labor, land, and capital 
tells us little about the location of financial centers. Instead, international politics, political 
stability, suitable domestic regulation, the development of communications and aviation 
networks, and good location of cities have combined to favor some places and disfavor others.  
Congested cities, such as Hong Kong and Singapore, may especially welcome an 
environmentally clean service industry that requires only low levels of material supplies and 
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utility inputs and relatively little ground area or plant and heavy equipment. Furthermore, the 
industry’s disproportionate reliance on ICT infrastructure and services and on systems for 
extensive training of a skilled workforce contribute to the development of quasi-public goods 
that can be used at very low cost by others without requiring costly investments in additional 
capacity. Tschoegl (2000) believes that the communications revolution that has minimized the 
economic significance of distance or space has not equally diminished the importance of place. 
Clark (2002) cites scale economies and product complementarities combined with a distinctive 
regulatory heritage and the interaction between market liquidity and the scope of products 
offered as keeping the financial business tied to the ground in London. Like Tschoegl and Sassen 
(2002) he dismisses the thesis of “the end of geography,” such as that reflected in Kaufman 
(2001, pp. 375-376), that acceleration of advances in telecommunications and computer 
technology in recent years is likely to further reduce the need for physical and permanent IFSCs. 
Yet the communities and frequent contacts of top IFS professionals are increasingly virtual and 
global as many of them appear to be in perpetual motion and constantly connected for the benefit 
of clients. Furthermore, whether global financial system security, uninterrupted maintenance and 
development, and systems-failure management are better served by physical concentration or 
dispersion of IFS providers and (back-up) facilities, has rarely been considered.  
Blommestein (2006) discerns two opposing tendencies at work. Having global 
communications available at negligible cost indeed has made some lines of the financial service 
business entirely footloose in that it has no attachment to place. Rather, where it happens to take 
place is dictated solely by current cost considerations, and there is little to inhibit rapid 
relocation. If a particular line of the financial business is subject to economies of scale in service 
production but also to diseconomies of distance (see Rose and Spiegel, 2005), the business could 
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tend to become more concentrated by location when distance costs fall. As Berger, DeYoung, 
and Udell (2001) point out, efficiency barriers to operating across borders may arise from 
distance, from differences in language, culture, currency, and regulatory/supervisory structures, 
and from explicit and implicit rules against foreign competitors. If any of these efficiency 
barriers to the export of financial services diminish, remote locations can be serviced 24 hours a 
day at lower cost from a given center. Yet traditional financial centers may not benefit. Rather, 
centers designed to perform low value-added financial services, such as routine billing and 
accounting services, may increasingly be established in, and dispersed over, new locations. In the 
United States, for instance, such centers of activity may shift from New York City to South 
Dakota and to hard-pressed cities such as Buffalo and then be dispersed over Central American 
and Asian locations.   
On the other hand, high-value added financial services have to address increasingly 
complex and long-horizon financial management tasks in close and intimate collaboration with 
clients. These clients require frequent personal, often face-to-face, contacts and almost instant 
availability through global communications at all times. They may also expect prompt execution 
and settlement during local business hours and under their national legal and accounting system 
even though universal rules, standards, and protocols increasingly may apply. Hence footloose 
international financial services and sticky such services, that cling to their established 
relationship with IFSCs and their individually distinctive clients, will co-exist. 
 Blommestein’s (2006) main thesis is that the product-driven financial supermarket model 
and the bancassurance model of providing full in-house service both need to be revised. Instead, 
a relationship-cum-market-based banking and finance system is emerging in which specialized 
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financial engineering development and applications for clients and the integration of products 
and services from outside suppliers play a greater role than before.  
Similarly PricewaterhouseCoopers (2005, p. 5) notes that many [financial] institutions 
will compete “to meet the demand for long-term savings products and for life-cycle wealth 
management services” with “the goal of building a long-lasting and multi-faceted relationship 
with the customer.” The report (p. 6) anticipates that “rising competitive pressures will force 
institutions to differentiate themselves more aggressively, whether through their product mix, 
their market focus, or their branding proposition. Conglomerate structures will wear less well 
that competency-led ones. Cost efficiency will remain key: Expect a further acceleration in the 
outsourcing of non-core functions.” Several contributions in Pastré, Jeffers, Blommestein, and de 
Pontbriand (2007) elaborate on these themes. 
 Hence two distinct strategies that are sustainable for developing competitive advantage, 
differentiation and cost efficiency, first identified by Porter (1985), are at work in reshaping the 
financial services industry. On the one hand, the search for cost efficiency leads to simplification 
and standardization, as through the use of index products and passive (computer-driven) 
screening techniques in asset management, to drive down cost (see Moles, 2006). Indeed, 
fragmentation of production is becoming almost as pronounced in IFS as it has been in 
manufacturing for some time. Yet on the other hand, particularly in private banking and in 
dealing with high net-worth individuals, fee-intensive differentiation through customization is 
the key to competitive success. Hence what keeps IFS, as a profit- and employment-generating 
value-added activity, tied to a particular location is a vexing, but unavoidable, question for any 
metropolis or country that seeks to keep or attract a substantial share of the world’s IFS activity. 
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VII. Conclusion 
There are some evolutionary trends that loosen and others that strengthen the ties of particular 
lines of IFS to location, depending on the level of sophistication of these lines of business. The 
protections previously provided by agglomeration effects and strong hysteresis in economic 
geography may be weakening: Electronic network groups and platforms, including proprietary 
networks and virtual “communities,” may replace the benefits of physical togetherness and ease 
of interaction in one place. Yet policy and management responses to a loss of business by and 
from a particular location may be fierce. Economically this may give the appearance of 
downward inelasticity of supply of financial services in a particular location, especially if there 
are allocative inefficiencies that can be reduced under pressure to maintain competitiveness.  
Given these diverging tendencies in a global competitive environment, what 
public/private strategies promise to be most profitable and sustainable for conducting ever-
changing configurations of financial-business functions? Identifying and structuring the 
analytical models, tools and data to be used for a comprehensive competitiveness and business-
outlook assessment could provide information that is critical to answering this question for a 
particular location. The present survey is designed to help structure such research by outlining 
some of the key locational, macroeconomic, and microeconomic perspectives -- and the 
attendant issues of measurement, analysis, and policy -- that have to be addressed. 
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